

SAVE on XRPL Whitepaper

A Rule-Based Exit Floor Asset on the XRP Ledger

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Abstract

SAVE on the XRP Ledger is a fixed-supply, issuer-immutable digital asset that enforces a strictly non-decreasing exit floor for holders. The exit floor is enforced directly on the XRPL decentralized exchange through posted BUY limit orders, without reliance on smart contracts, AMMs, implied liquidity, or algorithmic pricing. SAVE operates under a rule-based monetary model in which controlled distribution is implemented through SELL orders posted at a fixed 10% spread above the current exit floor, while exit enforcement is provided by a single standing BUY order whose price never decreases. This document describes the XRPL-specific implementation of the SAVE Core Model, including distribution parameters, exit floor enforcement, governance constraints, and independent verification procedures.

SAVE Core Model

Distribution and Exit Enforcement Framework

This section clarifies the enforcement structure and terminology used throughout the SAVE Core Model. It is normative and applies to all SAVE implementations.

SAVE uses two distinct on-ledger mechanisms, each with a single, well-defined role:

1. A distribution mechanism maintaining a **fixed 10% spread**, implemented via **SELL limit orders**.
2. **A single standing BUY order**, which defines and enforces the exit floor.

Distribution SELL orders are posted at a fixed **10% premium** above the **current exit floor**.

Purpose

SAVE exists to enforce a **strictly non-decreasing exit floor** for token holders.

The exit floor is not an algorithmic estimate, a promise, or a narrative claim. It is a **directly enforceable market condition**, implemented using native DEX primitives.

If the exit floor ever decreases, the SAVE model fails.

This rule supersedes all other considerations.

What SAVE Is (and Is Not)

SAVE is

- a fixed-supply asset
- Issuer-immutable
- enforced on-chain
- rule-based, not discretionary
- auditable by third parties

SAVE is not

- a smart-contract protocol
- an AMM-backed token
- a yield instrument
- a stablecoin
- a promise of full instant redemption

SAVE makes **one claim only**:

the minimum enforceable exit price never goes down.

The Exit Floor (Canonical Definition)

The **exit floor** is defined as:

the highest active BUY price for SAVE on the chain's native DEX

Formally, at time t:

$$F_t = \max\{p \mid \text{BUY offer at price } p \text{ is active on-ledger}\}$$

Only **posted BUY orders** define the exit floor.

The following are explicitly excluded:

- wallet balances
- AMM reserves
- liquidity pool balances
- implied or off-ledger backing

Distribution Mechanism (Fixed 10% Spread)

Distribution of SAVE occurs through SELL limit orders posted on the native decentralized exchange of the underlying ledger at a fixed **10% spread** above the current exit floor. These SELL orders have the following properties:

- SELL prices maintain a fixed 10% premium above the current exit floor.
- SAVE is released into the market in discrete lots.
- Distribution parameters (lot sizes) are governance-controlled.
- The 10% spread is maintained as the exit floor increases.

Let F_t denote the exit floor at time t and P_t denote the distribution SELL price. The distribution pricing satisfies:

$$P_n + 1 \geq P_n$$

Exit Floor Enforcement (Standing BUY Order)

SAVE enforces its exit guarantee through a **single standing BUY limit order** posted on the native decentralized exchange.

This BUY order defines the **exit floor**, which is formally defined as:

The highest active BUY price for SAVE on the decentralized exchange.

At any time, a holder may sell SAVE at or below the exit floor, subject to the size of the posted BUY order.

Exit enforcement has the following properties:

- Only **one BUY order** defines the exit floor at any given time.
- The BUY order is **replaced**, not stepped, when the floor is raised.
- The exit floor is **strictly non-decreasing**.
- No BUY order at a lower price may replace a higher one.

Let F_t denote the exit floor at time t . The exit floor satisfies the invariant:

$$F_{t+1} \geq F_t$$

Distribution Spread (Global Constraint)

For all chains:

$$P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$$

Where:

- P_t is the distribution (SELL) price at time t
- F_t is the exit floor (BUY) price at time t

Under normal operation:

- SELL prices maintain a fixed 10% spread above the exit floor
- As the exit floor increases, SELL prices automatically adjust
- The 10% spread relationship is invariant

Any exception to the 10% spread requires an explicit governance vote.

Circulating Supply (Conservative Definition)

For the purposes of exit floor enforcement, **circulating SAVE excludes**:

- SAVE held in liquidity pools
- SAVE committed to distribution offers
- SAVE committed to exit floor offers

Only SAVE that is economically free to exit is considered circulating.

This conservative definition ensures the exit floor applies **fairly and uniformly**.

No AMM or Implied Liquidity Assumptions

SAVE does not rely on:

- AMM pricing curves
- Liquidity pool balances
- Implied reserves
- Algorithmic pegs or stabilization mechanisms

Only **explicitly posted BUY limit orders** define and enforce the exit floor.

Enforcement Hierarchy

There is **one and only one** enforcement mechanism:

Active BUY orders on the native DEX

Everything else is informational or auxiliary.

This hierarchy is intentional:

- it favors verifiability over abstraction
- it avoids algorithmic ambiguity
- it allows independent auditing

Governance Boundary

Governance may:

- approve changes to distribution mechanisms
- approve exceptions to monotonicity
- modify operational cadence

Governance may **not**:

- mint additional SAVE
- retroactively alter prior distribution mechanisms
- secretly override the exit floor

All governance actions must be visible and attributable.

Falsifiability

The SAVE model is explicitly falsifiable.

It fails if **any** of the following occur:

- the exit floor decreases
- a BUY offer is placed below a prior floor
- monotonicity is violated without governance approval
- issuer immutability is broken

These conditions are observable on-chain.

Relationship to Chain-Specific Papers

This Core Model is **normative**.

Each chain-specific whitepaper:

- defines parameter values
- describes operational details
- provides verification steps

If a chain paper contradicts this Core Model, **the Core Model prevails**.

Summary

SAVE is not defined by its chain, supply, or UI.

It is defined by **one invariant rule**:

The exit floor only moves up.

Everything else is implementation.

SAVE Core Model Diagram

One Distribution Mechanism. One Exit Floor.

One Enforcement Mechanism.

Canonical Conceptual Diagram (authoritative)

The following diagram illustrates the SAVE Core Model independently of chain.

SAVE Core Model (Canonical)

Constraint-based model — no ladders, no implied flows

Core Principle

The enforceable exit floor only moves up.

Invariant: $F_{t+1} \geq F_t$

Exit Floor Enforcement (BUY)

Exactly one standing BUY order defines the exit floor.
The BUY order may be replaced only to raise the floor.

$F_t = \text{highest active BUY price}$

Only posted BUY orders are authoritative.

Distribution Mechanism (SELL)

SAVE is released via SELL limit orders (batch size & cadence are governed).
SELL pricing is mechanically derived from the exit floor.

$P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$

SELLs do not define or enforce the exit floor.

Circulating SAVE

For exit floor evaluation:

- Exclude SAVE in liquidity pools
- Exclude SAVE in SELL offers
- Exclude SAVE in BUY offers

Include only SAVE that is economically free to exit.

AMMs / Liquidity Pools

Secondary infrastructure only.

They do not:

- define the exit floor
- count as backing
- enforce guarantees

Invariants: $F_{t+1} \geq F_t \mid P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$

Enforcement is exclusively via posted BUY orders on the native DEX.

Diagram Interpretation

This diagram is conceptual and describes SAVE's enforcement structure, not a multi-level order book. At any given moment, the exit floor is defined by **exactly one** standing BUY order at price F_t (the highest active BUY on the native DEX). Distribution occurs separately via SELL limit orders priced at a fixed premium above the current floor: $P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$. SELL orders do not define the exit floor and do not enforce guarantees. AMMs and liquidity pools may exist for swapping convenience, but they are explicitly non-authoritative and are not used to define the exit floor or backing.

SAVE on XRPL

A Rule-Based Exit Floor Asset on the XRP Ledger

Network: XRP Ledger

Asset Code: SAVE

Total Supply: ~115,000 SAVE

Issuer Status: Permanently blackholed

Operation Status: Live

1. Overview

SAVE on the XRP Ledger is a fixed-supply digital asset designed to enforce a **strictly non-decreasing exit floor**. This implementation adheres to the invariant rules defined in the SAVE Core Model, including strict monotonicity of the exit floor and **enforcement exclusively through posted BUY orders**.

The exit floor is enforced directly on the XRPL decentralized exchange via posted **BUY limit orders**. SAVE does not rely on AMM pricing, implied liquidity, smart contracts, or algorithmic pegs.

The mission of SAVE is singular: to ensure that the minimum enforceable exit price never decreases.

The SAVE Core Model defines the invariant rules governing all SAVE implementations. This document describes the XRPL-specific implementation of that model. In the event of any conflict, the SAVE Core Model prevails.

2. Supply and Issuance

Total supply: 115,000 SAVE

Issuer: blackholed

Minting: disabled

Freeze / clawback: impossible

Once issued, SAVE became an immutable asset on the XRP Ledger. No additional SAVE can ever be created, revoked, frozen, or altered.

3. Core Principle: The Exit Floor

The **exit floor** is defined as the highest active BUY price for SAVE on the XRPL decentralized exchange.

If a holder sells SAVE at or below the exit floor, the trade executes immediately, subject to the size of the posted BUY order.

The exit floor is **strictly non-decreasing**.

4. Enforcement Mechanism (One Only)

SAVE uses a **single enforcement mechanism: standing BUY limit orders** on the XRPL decentralized exchange, denominated in XRP and purchasing SAVE.

No AMM pricing, liquidity pool balances, or implied reserves are used to define or support the exit floor.

5. Distribution and Exit Enforcement Model (XRPL)

SAVE on XRPL follows the same Core Model as Stellar and implements **two distinct on-ledger mechanisms**, each with a clearly defined role:

1. **A distribution mechanism** maintaining a **fixed 10% spread**, implemented via SELL limit orders
2. **An exit floor**, enforced via a single standing BUY limit order

These mechanisms are independent and serve different functions within the system.

5.1 Distribution Mechanism (Fixed 10% Spread)

Distribution of SAVE on XRPL occurs through SELL limit orders posted on the XRPL decentralized exchange at a fixed 10% spread above the current exit floor. These SELL orders have the following properties:

- SAVE is released in fixed-size batches
- SELL prices maintain a **fixed 10%** premium above the current exit floor
- Distribution parameters (lot sizes) are governance-controlled
- The **10% spread** relationship is maintained as the exit floor increases

Let F_t denote the exit floor at time t and P_t denote the distribution SELL price. The distribution pricing satisfies:

$$P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$$

5.2 Exit Enforcement (Standing BUY Order)

SAVE enforces its exit guarantee on XRPL through **one standing BUY limit order** posted on the XRPL decentralized exchange.

This BUY order defines the **exit floor**, which is formally defined as:

The highest active BUY price for SAVE on the XRPL DEX.

At all times, exit enforcement is provided by **a single BUY order only**. Increases to the exit floor occur through **replacement** of the existing BUY order with a new BUY order at a higher price. The exit floor never decreases.

Let F_t denote the exit floor at time t . The exit floor satisfies:

$$F_{t+1} \geq F_t$$

5.3 Enforcement Scope

The exit floor on XRPL is enforced **exclusively** through posted BUY limit orders. SAVE does not rely on:

- AMM pricing
- Liquidity pool balances
- Implied reserves
- Algorithmic stabilization mechanisms

Only explicitly posted BUY orders define the enforceable minimum exit price.

6. XRPL Parameters

This section defines the on-ledger parameters used by SAVE on the XRP Ledger. Parameters governing distribution and exit enforcement are defined separately and must not be conflated.

6.1 Distribution Parameters (SELLs)

Distribution of SAVE on XRPL is implemented through fixed-lot SELL limit orders posted on the XRPL decentralized exchange at a **fixed 10% spread** above the current exit floor.

- **Distribution mechanism:** SELL limit order
- **Lot size:** fixed per distribution batch
- **Pricing constraint:** fixed 10% spread above exit floor

Distribution pricing follows the invariant defined in the Core Model:

$$P_t = 1.1 \times F_t$$

Distribution parameters may be modified only through explicit governance approval.

6.2 Exit Floor Parameters (BUY)

Exit enforcement on XRPL is implemented through **a single standing BUY limit order** posted on the XRPL decentralized exchange.

- **Enforcement mechanism:** standing BUY limit order
- **Floor definition:** highest active BUY price
- **Monotonicity:** strictly non-decreasing

At any given time, exactly one BUY order defines the exit floor. When the exit floor is raised, the existing BUY order is **replaced** with a new BUY order at a higher price. Replacement at a lower price is not permitted.

Let F_t denote the exit floor at time t . The exit floor satisfies:

$$F_{t+1} \geq F_t$$

The size of the posted BUY order may vary by update and does not affect the definition of the exit floor.

6.3 Exclusions

SAVE on XRPL does not rely on:

- AMM pricing
- Liquidity pool balances
- Implied reserves
- Algorithmic stabilization or peg mechanisms

Only explicitly posted BUY limit orders define and enforce the exit floor.

7. Circulating Supply Definition

For exit floor calculations, **circulating SAVE excludes**:

- SAVE in liquidity pools
- SAVE in distribution mechanism offers
- SAVE in exit floor offers

This conservative definition ensures the exit floor applies only to SAVE that is economically free to exit.

8. AMMs (Explicitly Secondary)

AMMs exist only to:

- facilitate swaps
- meet user expectations

AMMs:

- are not relied upon
- are not counted as backing
- do not influence the exit floor

SAVE on XRPL is **DEX-first**, not AMM-driven.

9. Governance

- Procedural / social governance
- Any change to the spread relationship requires a vote
- Operators cannot reduce prices unilaterally

10. Risks

- Manual execution (automation planned)
- Finite liquidity depth
- XRP-denominated exit floor

If the exit floor ever decreases, the model fails.

11. Summary

SAVE on XRPL is:

- fixed supply
- issuer-immutable
- enforced via on-ledger BUY orders
- governed by strict monotonic rules

The exit floor only moves up.

12. Formal Model and Invariants

This section formally defines the SAVE Core Model using explicit variables and invariants. The model distinguishes between **distribution pricing**, which is a fixed 10% spread above the current floor, and **exit enforcement**, which is not laddered and is defined by a single standing BUY order.

12.1 Definitions

Let:

- P_t denotes the distribution SELL price at time t
- F_t denotes the **exit floor** at time t , defined as the highest active BUY price.
- $Q_b(t)$ denotes the quantity of SAVE bid by the standing BUY order at time t .
- α denotes the fixed spread multiplier ($\alpha = 1.10$ for 10% spread)
- Δf denotes the minimum allowed increase between successive exit floor prices.

12.2 Distribution Spread Invariant (SELLs)

Distribution of SAVE occurs through SELL limit orders posted at a fixed 10% spread above the current exit floor.

The distribution pricing satisfies the invariant:

$$P_t = \alpha \times F_t = 1.10 \times F_t$$

This ensures that SAVE is always distributed at a consistent premium above the exit floor. Distribution parameters, including lot sizes and the spread multiplier α , are governance-controlled.

12.3 Exit Floor Definition (BUY)

Exit enforcement is provided by **a single standing BUY limit order**.

The exit floor is formally defined as:

$$F_t = \max\{\text{active BUY prices at time } t\}$$

At any time t , exactly one BUY order defines the exit floor.

12.4 Exit Floor Invariant

The exit floor satisfies the monotonicity invariant:

$$F_{t+1} \geq F_t$$

An increase in the exit floor occurs only when the standing BUY order is **replaced** by a new BUY order at a higher price. Replacement at a lower price is not permitted.

There is no ladder or sequence of simultaneous BUY orders.

12.5 Execution Guarantee

For any holder submitting a SELL order at price p :

$$P \leq F_t \Rightarrow \text{immediate execution, subject to } Q_b(t)$$

This guarantee holds solely by virtue of posted BUY liquidity and does not rely on implied reserves, AMMs, or algorithmic mechanisms.

12.6 Floor Increase Condition

A floor increase from F_t to F_{t+1} may occur only if sufficient BUY liquidity is posted to support the intended exit floor.

Formally:

$$Q_b(t+1) \geq Q_{\text{required}}$$

where Q is defined as the quantity of SAVE subject to exit guarantees at the new floor level.

12.7 Observed Properties

Under normal operation, SAVE exhibits the following properties:

- Distribution prices increase monotonically.
- The exit floor never decreases.
- Exit enforcement is always explicit and observable on-ledger.
- All guarantees are falsifiable via inspection of posted BUY orders.

No assumption is made regarding AMM balances, liquidity pool depth, or external price references.

12.8 Model Summary

SAVE's formal model consists of:

- A **fixed 10% spread** distribution mechanism governing SELL prices..
- A **single standing BUY order** defining the exit floor.
- Two key invariants:
 - $P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$ (distribution spread)
 - $F_{t+1} \geq F_t$ (exit floor monotonicity)

Together, these invariants ensure that SAVE's exit guarantees are enforced entirely through observable on-ledger actions, with distribution occurring at a predictable premium above the floor.

Appendix A — How to Verify SAVE on XRPL

This appendix enables **independent verification** of SAVE's core claims using public XRPL data.

No trust in off-chain statements is required.

A.1 Asset Identification

Verify via any XRPL explorer.

A.2 Operational Wallets

- **Distribution / Buyback wallet:** `rJ5EWsAX5YuudrQTei7ZFm5Jpqa25QGUrD`

This wallet is responsible for placing SELL offers.

A.3 Verify the Exit Floor

1. Open the SAVE/XRP pair on an XRPL DEX interface
2. Inspect the **BUY side** of the order book
3. Identify the **highest BUY price**
4. Note this price as F_t (the current exit floor)

That highest BUY price is the enforceable exit floor.

A.4 Verify Buyback Monotonicity

1. Open the SAVE/XRP pair on an XRPL DEX interface
2. Inspect the SELL side of the order book
3. Identify the lowest SELL price (P_t)
4. Compare to the exit floor (F_t) from **A.3 Verify the Exit Floor**
5. Confirm:
 - o $P_t = 1.10 \times F_t$ (within rounding tolerance)
 - o SELL orders maintain **10% spread** above BUY floor

To verify historical compliance:

1. Open the transaction history of the distribution wallet
2. Filter for:
 - o TransactionType = OfferCreate
 - o TakerPays = SAVE
 - o TakerGets = XRP
3. For each SELL order, verify it was posted at ~110% of the exit floor at that time

A.5 Verify Circulating Supply Assumptions

Confirm that SAVE held in:

- liquidity pools
- active SELL offers
- active BUY offers

is excluded when evaluating whether the exit floor can advance.

Only SAVE that is economically free to exit is considered circulating.

A.6 What Would Invalidate the Model

Any of the following would falsify SAVE's XRPL claim:

- a BUY offer placed below the prior exit floor
- a SELL offer placed at less than 10% spread above the exit floor without governance approval
- new SAVE issuance from the blackholed issuer

None have been observed historically.

Appendix B — Common Misinterpretations

This appendix addresses frequent misunderstandings about SAVE's design, enforcement model, and guarantees. All clarifications below are normative and governed by the **SAVE Core Model**.

B.1 “SAVE is AMM-backed”

Incorrect.

SAVE does **not** rely on Automated Market Makers for backing, enforcement, or exit guarantees.

- AMMs do not define the exit floor
- AMM liquidity is not counted as backing
- AMM prices are not authoritative

AMMs exist solely to facilitate swaps and meet user expectations.

The **only** enforcement mechanism is posted BUY orders on the native DEX.

B.2 “Liquidity pool balances guarantee redemptions”

Incorrect.

Liquidity pool balances are explicitly **excluded** from exit floor calculations.

SAVE held in:

- liquidity pools
- distribution offers
- exit floors

is treated as **non-circulating** for enforcement purposes.

The exit floor applies only to SAVE that is economically free to exit.

B.3 “Wallet balances define the floor”

Incorrect.

Wallet balances indicate *capacity*, not enforcement.

Only **active BUY limit orders** define the enforceable exit floor.

Unposted reserves, regardless of size, do not constitute a guarantee.

B.4 “SAVE guarantees full redemption of the entire supply at the floor”

Incorrect.

SAVE does not guarantee instantaneous redemption of the entire circulating supply at a single price level. Instead, SAVE enforces a **minimum exit price per unit of SAVE**, where each unit sold executes immediately against explicitly posted BUY liquidity.

Each BUY order represents paid-for exit capacity. When a unit of SAVE is sold, the corresponding base asset is transferred, and that unit of SAVE is removed from circulation. In this sense, **each token pays for its own exit**.

Redemption capacity therefore scales with posted BUY liquidity and does not rely on implied depth, pooled reserves, or synthetic backing. Larger exits may occur over time as exit liquidity is posted and consumed, but every executed exit is fully funded, observable, and final.

B.5 “SAVE is a stablecoin”

Incorrect.

SAVE is **not** pegged to fiat or any external unit of account.

- XRPL SAVE is denominated in XRP
- Stellar SAVE is denominated in XLM

The exit floor is **monotonic**, not fixed.

B.6 “SAVE uses smart contracts to enforce guarantees”

Incorrect.

SAVE intentionally avoids smart contracts.

All enforcement occurs through:

- native DEX limit orders
- issuer immutability
- transparent governance constraints

This design favors verifiability over abstraction.

B.7 “SAVE on XRPL and Stellar are interchangeable”

Incorrect.

SAVE exists as **separate implementations** on:

- XRP Ledger
- Stellar Network

They are **not bridged**, not fungible across chains, and not interchangeable.

They share:

- one mission
- one Core Model
- one enforcement philosophy

They differ in:

- supply
- denomination
- spread relationship

B.8 “Distribution pricing and exit floors are the same thing”

Incorrect.

SAVE uses two distinct mechanisms:

1. Distribution mechanism (SELLs)

- releases SAVE at a fixed **10% spread** above the exit floor
- does not enforce the exit floor
- automatically adjusts as the floor rises

2. Exit floor (BUYs)

- enforces the exit floor
- sole enforcement mechanism
- defines the base price from which the **10% spread** is calculated

Conflating the two leads to *incorrect* conclusions.

B.9 “The exit floor can be changed arbitrarily by operators”

Incorrect.

Under normal operation:

- the exit floor is **strictly monotonic**
- downward repricing is prohibited

Any exception requires an **explicit governance vote**.

Operators cannot reduce the exit floor unilaterally.

B.10 “Revenue sources are required to maintain the floor”

Incorrect.

Revenue sources (e.g. prior experiments, partnerships, or sales) are **orthogonal** to the model.

They may:

- strengthen reserves
- accelerate floor price advancement

They do **not**:

- define the exit floor
- change enforcement rules
- create guarantees

The model remains valid even in the absence of new revenue.

B.11 “If the market price is below the floor, the model is broken”

Incorrect.

Market prices may temporarily deviate due to:

- thin liquidity
- partial distribution offer fills
- off-order-book trades

The model fails **only if**:

- a BUY order is posted below a prior exit floor
- the highest BUY price decreases

The authoritative signal is the **order book**, not last trade price.

B.12 “SAVE relies on trust in the team”

Incorrect.

SAVE minimizes trust by design.

Core guarantees rely on:

- issuer immutability
- posted on-ledger orders
- explicit monotonic constraints
- public verification procedures

Trust in operators affects *execution speed*, not *rules*.

B.13 “SAVE is complicated”

Misleading.

SAVE’s **implementation** has details.

Its **rule** is simple:

The exit floor only moves up.

Everything else exists to enforce that rule transparently.

Closing Note

Most misunderstandings about SAVE arise from applying assumptions common in other crypto systems—AMM pegs, algorithmic backing, or discretionary policy—to a model that explicitly rejects them.

SAVE is intentionally narrow in scope.

That narrowness is the point.